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ALUMNI NEWSLETTER

Robert Marshall

Robert C. Marshall

Professor and Head

12-16-04

Dear Alumni: 

Hope all is well. I am writing to provide a quick update about the Department and to invite you to our alumni reception to be held at the Annual ASSA Meeting in Philadelphia in January. I would very much enjoy seeing you at that event. 

Alumni Reception 

Date: January 8, 2005 

Place: Philadelphia Marriott

Grand Ballroom/Salon L 

Time: 6:00-8:00 pm

Faculty 

Graduate Students 

Undergraduate Program 

Overall, the Department continues to forge ahead. As I have noted in previous letters, as our external reputation makes significant advances your degree becomes ever more valuable. 

Let me know if you have any questions or comments ( rmarshall@psu.edu ). 

Sincerely, 

signature

Robert C. Marshall

Professor and Head 

P.S. If you wish to make a contribution to the Department please send checks to: 

Department of Economics

The Pennsylvania State University

614 Kern Bldg.

University Park, PA 16802 

Sophie Bade Research

My research focuses on political economy, game theory and decision theory. 

In my job market paper I investigated electoral competition between two office-motivated parties. Deviating from the standard assumption that all that matters in politics can be aligned on a left-right spectrum, I assumed that voters do care about a variety of different issues. The problem with this increase in realism about voter preferences is that the most common models of electoral competition fail to have any equilibria without the assumption that the political spectrum is unidimensional. I solve this - well known -problem by assuming that parties dislike situations in which their share of the vote becomes very unpredictable. With this novel assumption on the behavior of parties I can show that the platforms of opportunistic parties will also when voters care about multiple issues converge to the "middle" of all the different voters' most preferred platforms. In a sense, this work can be seen as an extension of the celebrated median voter theorem to a world with multiple issues. 

I also worked on game theory with indecisive players. As an application of this work I characterize equilibria of oligopolisitic competition when firms care about more than just profits, say when firms also care about their revenues and sales. In political economy I have used a two-party-model similar to the one described above to further a new explanation for the fact that in equilibrium two candidates rarely ever announce the exact same platform. 

Currently I am working on a model of advertising in electoral campaigns. My goal is to develop a model in which parties that run on less complex platforms have an edge over parties that run on more complex platforms. The complexity of a platform will be expressed in terms of the number of issues addressed in that platform and the role of advertising is to make learning about the different aspects of a platform less costly.