Placement Director: Vijay Krishna
    (814) 863-8543
    vkrishna@psu.edu

Contact Information:
Myeonghwan Cho
  Office: (814) 865-1108
  Cell: (814) 933-6551
E-mail: muc152@psu.edu
Website: http://my.win.psu.edu/muc152/

CITIZENSHIP:

• Republic of Korea (F-1 visa)

EDUCATION:

• Ph.D. Economics, The Pennsylvania State University, expected 2008
• M.A. Economics, Seoul National University, Korea, 2003
• B.A. Economics, Seoul National University, Korea, 1997

PH.D. THESIS:

• Local Public Goods and Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games on Networks
  Thesis Advisor: Professor Kalyan Chatterjee.

FIELDS:

• Primary: Microeconomics, Game Theory
• Secondary : Industrial Organization, Public Economics

PAPERS:

• Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game with Local Interaction and Local Communication, 2007
• Public Randomization in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game with Local Interaction, 2007
• Endogenous Formation of Networks for Local Public Goods, 2007
• Efficient Structure of Organization with Heterogeneous Workers, 2007

GRANTS &
FELLOWSHIPS:

• The Robert C. Daniels Graduate Fellowship, 2007
• The Will E. Mason Memorial Endowment Award, 2007
• The David W. and Carolyn P. Grow Graduate Fellowship, 2006

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

• Teaching Assistant at The Pennsylvania State University
  • Graduate (5 semesters): Math Econ, Micro Theory, Advanced Micro
  • Undergraduate (3 semesters): Intermediate Micro, Strategy
• Teaching Assistant at Seoul National University, Korea
  • Undergraduate (4 semesters): Microeconomics, Fiscal Policy

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE:

• Research Assistant for Kalyan Chatterjee, 2007
• Research Assistant for Sophie Bade, 2005
• Research Assistant for Youngsub Chun, 2002~2003

PRESENTATIONS & OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES:

• 18th International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook University, 2007
• PET07 Conference, Vanderbilt University, 2007
• Micro Theory Seminar, The Pennsylvania State University , 2007

REFERENCES:

• Professor Kalyan Chatterjee
• Professor Edward Green
• Professor James Jordan
• Professor Vijay Krishna

THESIS ABSTRACT

After the earliest work on the Folk Theorem, there have been many attempts to study situations where perfect monitoring is not possible. In this paper, we analyze a specific situation where monitoring is not perfect, in that each agent observes only the actions of a proper subset of agents. In particular, t he paper considers a repeated prisoner's dilemma game in a network where each agent interacts only with his neighbors and also cannot observe the actions of others who are not directly connected to him. W hen agents are sufficiently patient and the loss from being cheated is small enough, a trigger strategy that observing a deviation causes a permanent punishment cannot be a sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, although the modification of the trigger strategy, following Ellison (1994), can be a sequential equilibrium supporting cooperation, it is not stable to mistakes in the sense that cooperation never resumes after a mistake to play defection occurs. In this paper, we allow agents to communicate with their neighbors and construct a sequential equilibrium for sufficiently patient agents which supports cooperation and is stable to mistakes. Since an agent cannot figure our whether his neighbor's defection is a deviation or a consequence of punishment, it is not possible to construct an equilibrium in which punishment occurs based on deviations. In the equilibrium we construct, punishment occurs based on surprises that are deviations from expectations not from strategies. T he role of local communication is to enable agents to resolve the discrepancy in their neighbors' beliefs on how many periods of punishment remain at any stage.

Essay 2: Public Randomization in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game with Local Interaction

The paper considers a situation where each agent interacts with his neighbors by playing repeated prisoner's dilemma games and observes only his neighbors' actions. In this environment, a trigger strategy or Ellison (1994)'s modification of the trigger strategy can be a sequential equilibrium which supports cooperation. However, these equilibria have an undesirable property that a small chance of a mistake (i.e. defecting) causes a complete breakdown of cooperation. In this paper, agents are assumed to observe a public randomization and we construct a sequential equilibrium for sufficiently patient agents , which supports cooperation and in which cooperation eventually resumes after any history. If there is a small possibility of mistakes, the equilibrium we construct can result in a more efficient outcome than the trigger strategy equilibrium, even though they give the same payoffs in the limit.

Essay 3. Endogenous Formation of Networks for Local Public Goods

The paper studies a situation where agents can make a binding agreement both on the quantity of local public goods and on the structure of networks through which they share the benefits of public goods. An agent enjoy s the benefit of public goods produced by others who are connected to him, and there is a cost to maintain a link as well as to produce a public good. Since agents can choose the amount of public goods, the value of a link is endogenously determined.

First, we characterize core allocations, which consist of a minimally connected network and a n action profile in which at most one agent does not produce the maximum amount of public good. Next, we consider two different models of sequential bargaining games through which a contract on an allocation is established. In the first model, we allow agents to propose an allocation and show that there is no symmetric stationary perfect equilibrium for sufficiently patient agents . In the second model, we allow agents to propose a distribution on allocations and find a symmetric stationary perfect equilibrium in which probabilistic choices are made on an equivalent class of allocations.

* The abstract of the paper “ Efficient Structure of Organization with Heterogeneous Workers ” is available on my webpage ( http://my.win.psu.edu/muc152/ ).