Jia Pan |
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Placement Director: Vijay Krishna
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Graduate Secretary & Placement Assistant: Lynn Sebulsky (814)865-1458 lms50@psu.edu |
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Curriculum Vitae |
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THESIS ABSTRACT Essay 1. The thesis provides a dynamic infinite-horizon general equilibrium model of financial intermediation that extends the model introduced by D. Diamond and P. Dybvig (JPE 1983). This extension enables the relationship between the real business cycle and the composition of assets held in the banking sector to be studied. As in the D-D model, a bank is an optimal financial coalition. In the model developed here, the bank's optimal policy involves decisions about liquidity that vary systematically over the business cycle. The analysis begins with a baseline model of an autarkic agent with two production technologies. One of these two technologies has a higher gross rate of return than the other does. While adjusting investment in the higher return technology will incur an convex cost. However, the other technology is freely adjustable. We refer to these as the illiquid technology and the liquid technology respectively. The optimal choice of the agent reflects the consumption preference shocks that he experiences. Without such shocks, the agent will always invest in the illiquid technology. However when agent's time preference fluctuates in a cyclical pattern, then the agent may transfer resources from the illiquid technology to the liquid technology at times when he anticipates desiring high consumption in the near future. By doing so, the agent can spread liquidation cost over two periods and avoid the steepest part of adjustment cost curve. This result is proved analytically for a deterministic preference shock cycle and verified numerically for Markovian shocks. The main model in the thesis builds on the baseline model by introducing a large population of agents with idiosyncratic preference shocks. In this model, we proved agents receive higher utility by trading through a financial intermediary than they could achieve by autarkic investment or direct trade with one another. The policy bank analyze based on the principal agent problem. The bank's optimal portfolio evolve the similar fashion to the autarkic agent's portfolio in the baseline model.
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