Curriculum Vitae

Placement Director: Neil Wallace
    (814) 863-3805
    neilw@psu.edu

Contact Information:
Hanjoon Michael Jung
  Office: (92-42) 3560-8051
  Cell: (92) 307-460-8887
E-mail: hanjoon@lums.edu.pk
Website: http://econ.lums.edu.pk/hanjoon

CITIZENSHIP:

• Republic of Korea

EDUCATION:

• Ph.D., Economics, Penn State University, Sep 2002 ~ May 2007
• B.A., Economics and History, Sungkyunkwan University, Korea, 2001

PH.D. THESIS:

• “Essays in Game Theory and Political Economy”
  Thesis Advisor: Professor James Jordan

FIELDS:

• Primary: Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Industrial Organization
• Secondary: Political Economy

• Assistant Professor (July 2007 ~ ), Department of Economics, Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS)

PUBLICATIONS:

1. “Spatial Pillage Game,” Forthcoming in Journal of Mathematical Economics
2. “Who benefits from a sender's credibility concern, the sender or a receiver?,” Forthcoming in Economics Letters
3. “Information Manipulation through the Media,” Forthcoming in Journal of Media Economics

WORKING PAPERS:

1. “Preference-based Cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game,” November 2007
2. “Complete Sequential Equilibrium and Its Alternative,” September 2009
3. “Strategic Information Transmission: Comment,” September 2009
   

1. “Control over Information”
2. “Cooperation and Matching Value”
3. “Sequential Rationality and Lexicographic Probability System”
4. “Hierarchy Pillage Game”
5. “Media Manipulation”
6. “Regular Sequential Equilibrium and Perfect Regular Equilibrium”
7. “Supply Chain of Perishable Produce”1. “Control over Information”
   

• Midwest Economic Theory Meeting, October 2009
• Public Economic Theory Conference (PET 2009), June 2009
• Public Economic Theory Conference (PET 2008), June 2008
• International Conference on Mathematics and its Application in Information Technology , March 2008
• Eastern Economic Association Annual Conference 2008
• XVth Public Economic Meeting, February 2008
• Midwest Economic Theory Meeting, October 2006

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

• Graduate at LUMS: Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory for Masters
• Undergraduate at LUMS: Advanced Game Theory for seniors, Advanced Mathematical Economics for seniors
• Teaching Assistant at Penn State: Introductory Microeconomics, Introductory Macroeconomics, Game Theory, Monetary Theory

OTHER ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE:

• Referee for the German Economic Review
• Research Assistant for James Jordan (Spring-Summer 2005, Summer 2006)

HONORS AND AWARDS:

• The First LUMS Research Award, The best Category (2008 -2009)
• The Second LUMS Research Award, The best Category (2009 -2010)
  

REFERENCES:

• Professor James Jordan (Thesis Advisor)
  Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University
  University Park, PA – 16802
  Phone: (814) 865 – 2201 (Office)
  (814) 863 – 4775 (Fax)
  E-mail: jxj13@psu.edu
• Professor Kalyan Chatterjee
  Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University
  University Park, PA – 16802
  Phone: (814) 865 – 6050 (Office)
  E-mail: kchatterjee@psu.edu
• Professor Vijay Krishna
  Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University
  University Park, PA – 16802
  Phone: (814) 865 – 6050 (Office)
  E-mail: vkrishna@psu.edu

THESIS ABSTRACT:

We propose a complete version of the sequential equilibrium (CSE) and its alternative solution concept (WCSE) for general finite-period games with observed actions. The sequential equilibrium (SE) is not a complete solution concept in that it might not be a Nash equilibrium in the general games that allow a continuum of types and strategies. The CSE is always a Nash equilibrium in the general games and is equivalent to the SE in finite games. So, the CSE is a complete solution concept in the general games as a version of the SE. The WCSE is a weak, but simple version of the CSE. It is also a complete solution concept and functions as an alternative solution concept to the CSE. Their relation to converted versions of the perfect equilibrium and the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is discussed.