Curriculum Vitae

Placement Director: Neil Wallace
    (814) 863-3805
    neilw@psu.edu

Contact Information:
Koichi Miyazaki
  Office: (814) 865-1108
  Home: (814) 777-1339
E-mail: kxm448@psu.edu
Website:www.econ.psu.edu/~kxm448

CITIZENSHIP:

• Japan (F-1 visa)

EDUCATION:

• Ph.D. Economics, The Pennsylvania State University (August 2005-present, expected completion date: June 2010)
• M.A. Economics, The University of Tokyo, March 2003
• B.A. Economics, The University of Tokyo, March 2001

PH.D. THESIS:

• “Essays on Public Economics”
  Thesis Advisor:  Edward Green

FIELDS:

• Primary: Macroeconomics, Public Economics
• Secondary: Political Economy, Game Theory

PAPERS:

• “Efficiency and Lack of Commitment in an Overlapping Generations Model with Distributional Shocks” (Job Market Paper)
• “Sequential Voting with Costly Information Acquisition: Three-Voter Case”
• “On the Comparison of Electoral Systems: District-by-District system versus Proportional system”
• “On Candidates’ Strategic Response to the Margin of Victory in Elections,” joint with Minoru Kitahara (submitted)
•  “Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information,” joint with Hitoshi Matsushima and Nobuyuki Yagi, (revision requested from Journal of Economic Theory)
• “Line-item Veto with Sophisticated Voters in Separation of Powers”

AWARDS:

• Finalist for 12th Moriguchi Prize, Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research, October 2009 (The winner will be decided in December 2009)
• CEMANO-COE Distinguished TA Award, Microeconomics (Graduate), The University of Tokyo, Winter 2004

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

• Teaching Assistant, University of Tokyo, Prof. Hitoshi Matsushima, Microeconomics (Graduate), Winter 2004
• Teaching Assistant, University of Tokyo, Prof. Akihiko Matsui, Mathematics for Economists (Graduate), Summer 2002
• Teaching Assistant for Several Undergraduate Courses at Penn State University and University of Tokyo

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE:

• Research Assistant, Penn State University, Prof. Ruilin Zhou, Summer 2009
• Research Assistant, Penn State University, Prof. Vijay Krishna, Fall 2007
• Research Assistant, University of Tokyo, Prof. Hitoshi Matsushima, Summer 2004

PRESENTATIONS & OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES:

• Midwest Economic Meetings, Economic Theory, Fall 2009, Penn State, US
• Far East and South Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society, Tokyo, Japan, 2009
• Fifteenth Decentralization Conference, Tokyo, Japan, 2009
• Kyoto Game Theory Workshop, Kyoto, Japan, 2004
• Japanese Economic Association, Autumn Meeting, Tokyo, Japan, 2003

REFERENCES:

• Prof. Edward Green, 415 Kern Building
  The Pennsylvania State University
  University Park, 16802
  Tel: (814)865-8493, E-mail: eug2@psu.edu

• Prof. Ruilin Zhou, 521 Kern Building
  The Pennsylvania State University
  University Park, 16802
  Tel: (814)865-2234, E-mail: rzhou@psu.edu

• Prof. Neil Wallace, 612 Kern Building
  The Pennsylvania State University
  University Park, 16802
  Tel: (814)863-3805, E-mail: neilw@psu.edu

THESIS ABSTRACT

Essay 1.“Efficiency and Lack of Commitment in an Overlapping Generations Model with Distributional Shocks” (Job market paper)

Abstract: This paper considers a stochastic overlapping generations model in which, at each date, a distributional shock divides the constant social endowment between a young and an old agent. Commitment cannot be externally enforced. More precisely, anyone can walk away from the economy at any time with her endowment. At each date, the young and the old agents simultaneously decide how much of their respective endowments to transfer to the other agent. I focus on a simple stationary transfer rule that is consistent with a limited commitment constraint, and characterize subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of these transfer rules. I also discuss the efficiency of these SPE allocations. The main finding is that for some parameter values, the SPE simple stationary transfer rule allocations are interim Pareto efficient in the set of all feasible allocations, a set that includes allocations that violate the limited commitment constraint.

Essay 2. “Sequential Voting with Costly Information Acquisition: Three-Voter Case”

Abstract: This paper extends a model discussed in Dekel and Piccione (2000) by adding a costly information acquisition stage. In Dekel and Piccione (2000), a symmetric sincere voting equilibrium in a simultaneous voting game is also an equilibrium in a sequential voting game. This paper shows that their result is not robust in some class of cost functions.