Curriculum Vitae
Yosuke Igarashi |
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Placement Director: Neil Wallace
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Curriculum Vitae |
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THESIS ABSTRACT The thesis consists of four essays ([1]-[4]). [1] A comment on: ‘Efficient propagation of shocks and the optimal return on money’ (joint work with Pidong Huang) This paper shows that introducing lotteries into Cavalcanti-Erosa (2008) eliminates two prominent features of their optima: over-production and history-dependence. Cavalcanti-Erosa (2008) study optima in a version of Trejos-Wright (1995). They introduce into it i.i.d. aggregate shocks to preferences, shocks with a two-point support. They show that for an interval of intermediate magnitudes for the discount factor, the ex ante optimum over all individually rational (IR) and deterministic trades displays two properties: output is higher than the first-best when the shock is such that the first-best output is low and there is history dependence—that is, promised utilities play a role. We show that if lotteries are allowed, then higher ex ante utility is achieved and neither property holds at an optimum. Moreover, the optimum can be supported by buyer take-it-or-leave-it offers.
[2] “Distributional effects of hiring through networks” (Job Market Paper) We present a variant of Galenianos (2011), a version of a random search model with two matching technologies: a standard matching function and worker networks. Our model has two types of workers, networked workers and non-networked workers. A steady state equilibrium exists where networked workers enjoy lower unemployment and higher wages, and it is unique under some conditions. Then we ask a question: how would a policy that bans the use of networks in hiring (e.g., anti-old boy network laws) affect welfare? It is shown that the effects of such a policy on non-networked workers can be either positive or negative, depending on model parameters. In our calibration, such a policy would make non-networked workers slightly worse off and networked workers substantially worse off.
[3] “Stability of monetary steady states in a matching model of money” (joint work with Pidong Huang) In the Trejos-Wright (1995) random matching model, people’s money holding is in {0,1} and the total stock of money is fixed, so the money-holding distribution across people is exogenously fixed. Under buyer take-it-or-leave-it offers, Zhu (2003) extends the money holding set to {0,1, …, N}. When N is greater than one, the money-holding distribution is no longer exogenous and becomes the state variable of the economy. Zhu shows existence of a valued-money, full-support steady state and existence of a valued-money non-full-support steady state. We analyze the stability of such steady states when N=2. When N=2, there are two monetary steady states: the full-support one and the non-full-support one, the latter being isomorphic to the Trejos-Wright steady state (no one holds or trades one unit). A sharp contrast is obtained: the full-support steady state is locally stable and determinate; the non-full-support steady state is unstable. The instability result says that if the economy starts with a small positive measure of people holding one unit of money, then it does not converge to the non-full-support steady state.
[4] “Why ten $1’s are not treated as a $10?” (Joint work with Pidong Huang) This paper generalizes the instability finding in [3] for the Zhu model with a general upper bound. |
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