The
Department
of Economics
Economics 570 Professor
Barry W. Ickes
Development Spring
2005
This is the first half of the Development
Economics sequence. In this part we focus on some aspects of development
economics and on the economics of transition. With regard to development
economics we will focus primarily on macroeconomic aspects of development, and
on the role of institutions and organization in economic development. We will
also study some aspects of stabilization and financial crises in developing
countries. We will then turn to the economics of transition. The balance
between the two parts will be an endogenous variable.
The basic question of development
economics is what accounts for differences in economic performance between rich
and poor countries. You could ask, “what makes some countries rich?”
Alternatively, it may be more fruitful to answer the question, “why are some
countries unable to become rich?” Recently, economists have focused on the role
of institutions in generating these differences. You could call the subject
comparative economic institutions. This focus also means that our concerns are
very close to those of economic history. Indeed, one could view economic
development and economic history as studying the same question, the former from
a cross-section perspective, the latter from a time-series perspective.
A good reference for anyone planning to
take the comprehensive exam in development are the Handbooks of Development
Economics:
H.
Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan, eds., Handbook
of Development Economics, vols. 1 and 2 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1988 and 1989).
J. Behrman and T.N. Srinivasan, eds., Handbook of Development Economics, vols. 3A and 3B. (Amsterdam:
North-Holland, 1995).
In
addition the following books may be useful:
Debraj Ray, Development Economics,
Kaushik
Basu, Analytical Development Economics,
MIT Press, 1997.
With
regard to transition economics there is a new textbook that is useful.
Gerard Roland, Transition and Economics. MIT Press, 2000. (GR)
These
references are useful in filling gaps and topics that may not be covered in
class. I did not assign any required texts.
Grading
There will be a midterm and a final
exam. In addition, you will be allowed
to submit a term paper of length 15-20 pages if you are interested in working further
in this field. The paper should either presents your own empirical work or
reviews the literature on a certain issue.
The midterm will count for 20% of the grade. The paper and final will
each count for 35% of your grade. The
remainder of your grade will be determined by class participation and
presentations. You should meet with me
early in the semester to discuss your paper.
The
discussion may resemble the following outline. Some papers are available on the
web, and are marked WEB. Materials for this course can be found on my website:
http://econ.la.psu.edu/~bickes/
1. Introduction
to Development and Transition Economics
What is
Development Economics about and how does it relate to Transition Economics? Are
the problems of emerging economies from poverty similar to those of economies
emerging from socialism? What does the study of transition teach us about
development? And vice versa? How should we think about this subject.
Ofer,
Gur, “Development
and Transition: Emerging, but Merging?” November 2000, mimeo, WEB.
Ickes, B.W., Lecture Note: Introduction to
Development and Transition. WEB
2. Stylized
Facts of Economic Growth and Explanations of Divergence
The most important stylized fact of
economic growth is the large divergence in output levels since the early 19th
century. What accounts for these differences? What are the systematic factors
that inhibit growth in much of the world?
Maddison, Angus, The World Economy: A Millenial Perspective. Paris, OECD, 2001.
Easterly,
William, and Ross Levine, “It’s
Not Factor Accumulation: Stylized Facts and Growth Models,” World Bank,
2001.
Caselli, Francesco, “Accounting for
Cross-Country Income Differences,” forthcoming in Handbook of Economic
Growth.
Hall,
R.E., and C.I. Jones, “Why Do
Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others?” Ouarterly Journal of Economics, 114:
83-116, 1999 (also NBER Working Paper,
6564, June 1999).
Klenow,
Peter and Andres Rodriguez-Clare, “The
Neoclassical Revival in Growth Economics: Has it Gone Too Far?” NBER
Macroeconomics Annual, 1997, 73-114.
Klenow,
Peter and Andres Rodriguez-Clare, “Externalities in Growth,”
forthcoming in Handbook of Economic Growth.
Jones,
Charles, “Growth
and Ideas,” forthcoming in Handbook of Economic Growth.
Burnside,
Craig, and David Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,”
AER, 90, 4, Sept 2000: 847-68.
Galor,
Oded and Omer Moav, “ Natural Selection and the Origin of Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117
(November 2002).
Acemoglu,
Daron, Phillipe Aghion, and Fabrizio Zilibotti, “Distance to Frontier,
Selection, and Economic Growth,” June 2002, Web.
Banerjee,
A., and E. Duflo, “Inequality
and Growth: What Can the Data Say?” NBER Working Paper, 7793, July 2000.
Easterly,
W., “Inequality Does Cause
Underdevelopment: New Evidence,” Center for Global Development, Working
Paper, 1, June 2002.
Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Peter Klenow, “Relative Prices and
Prosperity,” mimeo, April 2003.
Parente,
S., and
Howitt,
Peter, “Endogenous
Growth and Cross-Country Income Differences,” AER, 90, 4, Sept 2000: 829-846.
Mokyr,
Joel, “Long-term
Economic Growth and the History of Technology” forthcoming
in Handbook of Economic Growth.
Bloom,
David and Jeffrey Williamson, “Demographic
Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia” NBER Working Paper,
6268.
Bloom,
David, David Canning, and Jaypee Sevilla, “Economic Growth and the Demographic
Transition,” NBER Working Paper, 8685.
Azariadis,
Costas and John Stachurski, Poverty
Traps, forthcoming in Handbook of Economic Growth.
De
Long, J. Bradford, and
3. Institutions,
Organization and Economic Development
What role do institutions, and institutional innovation, play in economic development? We have seen that one explanation for the divergence that is observed across countries is related to institutions. We now turn to more specific mechanisms. How do economic organizations differ in developing and developed countries? The economics of organization explains the development of economic institutions as means of economizing on transactions costs. Are their specific problems faced by developing countries that inhibit the development of economic institutions? How does this impact on economic development? A theory of economic organization is crucial for development economics because of the wide variety of experiences observed. There is even an argument that this should form the basis for a new comparative economics.
Ray, chapters 5, 12.
Basu, chapters 1-2.
Stiglitz,
J. E., "Economic Organization, Information, and Development," Handbook of Development Economics, vol.
1, 1989.
Lin,
J.Y., “Collectivization and
Acemoglu,
Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and
Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,” NBER
Working Paper, 8460, September 2001. WEB
Easterly,
W., and R. Levine, “Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence
Economic Development,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 50, 1, January
2003: 3-39 (you can access a draft version here).
Glaeser,
E., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A Shleifer, “Do Institutions Cause Growth?”
NBER Working Paper, 10568.
Engerman,
Stanley L., Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Factor
Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among New World Economies,”
NBER Working Paper 9259.
Greif,
Avner, "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade:
The Maghribi Traders Coalition," American
Economic Review, vol. 83, 3, June 1993.
Greif,
A., P. Milgrom, and B.R. Weingast, “Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement:
The Case of the Merchant Guild,” Journal
of Political Economy, 102, 4, August 1994.
Greif,
A., “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and
Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individual Societies,” Journal of Political Economy, 102, 5,
October 1994.
Kremer,
M., “The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CVIII, 3, August 1993: 551-575.
Zak,
P., and S. Knack, “Trust and Growth,” Economic
Journal, April 2001.
Murphy,
Kevin, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, “The
Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth,” QJE, vol. 106, 2, May 1991: 503-30.
Caballero,
R., and M. Hammour, “Creative Destruction and Development: Institutions,
Crises, and Restructuring,” World Bank, ABCDE Conference, 2000. Web.
Hausmann,
Ricardo and Dani Rodrik, “ Economic
Development as Self-discovery,” NBER Working Paper 8952, November 2002.
Sachs,
Jeffrey, “ Institutions Don’t Rule:
Direct Effects of Geography on per Capita Income,” NBER Working Paper 9490,
February 2003.
Rodrik,
Dani and Arvind Subramanian, Francesco
Trebbi, “Institutions Rule: the
Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development,”
NBER Working Paper, 9305, November 2002.
Djankov,
Simeon , and Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane,
Andrei Shleifer, “The New
Comparative Economics,” Journal of
Comparative Economics, Vol 31, 4, December 2003.
4.
Political
Economy and Policy Reform
We observe divergence and the maintenance
of policies that seem completely inimical to improved performance. Why do these
policies persist? Policy reform is a key issue for developing economies. How
reforms are implemented is often as important as what reforms are implemented.
This is especially important as it related to corruption. A critical question
for development economics is whether or not corruption is a deterrent or a spur
to growth.
Shelifer,
A. and R. Vishny, “Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CVIII, 3,
August 1993: 5599-617.
Mauro, P., “Corruption and Growth,” QJE, CX, 3, August 1995.
Bardhan, Pranab, “Corruption and
Development,” Journal of Economic
Literature, Vol. XXXV, September 1997: 1320-1346.
Krusell,
Per and Jose-Victor Rios-Rull (1996). “Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of
Stagnation and Growth,” Review of
Economic Studies 63, #2, 301-329.
Acemoglu,
Daron, “Why Not a Political Coase
Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics,” Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 31, 4, December 2003.
Sonin,
K., “Why
the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights,” Journal of Comparative Economics, vol.
31, 4, December 2003.
Basu,
Susanto, and David Li, “Corruption and Reform,” Davidson Institute Working Paper, June 1996.
Krueger, Anne O., Political Economy of Policy Reform in
Developing Countries. MIT Press, 1993.
Rodrik, Dani, “Growth
Strategies,” Working Paper,
Tornell,
Aaron, “Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property Rights,”
Alesina,
A., and R. Perotti, “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and
Investment,” European Economic Review, 40, 1996: 1203-1228.
Rodrik,
D., “Understanding Economic Policy Reform,” Journal
of Economic Literature, XXXIV, March 1996: 9-41.
Hoff, K., "Beyond Rosenstein-Rodan:
The Modern Theory of Underdevelopment Traps," Annual
Bank Conference on Development Economics, 200
Fernandez, Raquel, and Dani
Rodrik, "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Precence of
Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, December 1991,
81, 5, 1146-1155.
Alesina, Alberto and Alan Drazen, "Why are
Stabilizations Delayed?" American Economic Review, December 1991,
81, 5. 1170-1188.
Mussa, Michael, “Government
Policy and the Adjustment Process, in J. Bhagwati, ed., Import Competition
and Response,
Mehlum, Halvor, “Speed
of adjustment and self-fulfilling failure of economic reform,” Journal
of International Economics, vol. 53, 1, February 2001: 149-67.
Berglof, Erik, and Patrick
Bolton, “Law
Enforcement, Fiscal Responsibility and Economic Development,” May 2002.
5. Finance, Financial Liberalization, and
Financial Crises
Financial Development is seen as a
key part of the development process. But is this a causal relationship? What is
the mechanism? An important question has been how applicable are such policies
to developing and transition economies. Recently, concern has shifted to financial
instability. Does Financial Liberalization enhance growth prospects once we
take into account potential instability? Globalization and capital mobility has
led to financial instability in emerging market economies. Capital inflows are
important to developing countries, but this also presents risks associated with
financial instability. The problems in
Levine, Ross, “Financial
Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda,” Journal of Economic
Literature, vol. XXV, June 1997, 688-726.
Acemoglu,
Daron and Fabrizio Zilibotti, “Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk,
Diversification and Growth,” JPE, vol. 105, 4, August 1997: 709-751.
Rajan,
R., and L. Zingales, “Financial Dependence and Growth,” AER, vol. 88, 3,
June 1998: 559-586.
Rajan,
R., and L. Zingales, “The
Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth Century,”
Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.
Bekaert,
G., C. Harvey, and C. Lundblad, “Does Financial Liberalization Spur Growth?” NBER
Working Paper, 8245, April 2001.
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, and Enrica
Detragiache, “Financial
Liberalization and Financial Fragility,” Annual World Bank Conference on
Development Economics,
Edwards,
S., and S. van Wijnbergen, "Disequilibrium and Structural
Adjustment," Handbook of Development Economics, vol 2, 1989.
Khan, Mohsin, "The
Macroeconomic Effects of IMF-Supported Adjustment Programs: An Empirical
Assessment," IMF Staff Papers, June 1990: 195-231.
Calvo, G., L. Leiderman, and C.M.
Reinhart, “Inflows of Capital to Developing Countries in the 1990's,” Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, Spring 1996: 123-139.
Calvo,
G., and
Agenor,
P-R., and P. Montiel, Development Macroeconomics, Princeton, New Jersey,
Princeton University Press, 1996: chapters 8, 10, 14, 16.
Radelet,
S. and J. Sachs, “The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies,
Prospects,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1998: 1-74.
Chang, R., and A.Velasco,
“Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: A Canonical Model,” NBER Working Paper,
#6606, June 1998. WEB: http://www.nber.org/new.html#latest.
Burnside,
C., M. Eichenbaum and S. Rebelo, 2001, "Prospective Deficits and the Asian
Currency Crisis", Journal of Political Economy, December 2001.
Caballero,
R., and A. Krishnamurthy, “Smoothing Sudden Stops,” NBER Working Paper 8427,
August 2001. WEB
Ranciere, Romain , Aaron Tornell,
and Frank Westermann, “Crises and
Growth: A Re-Evaluation,” NBER Working Paper No. 10073.
Aghion,
Philippe , and Philippe Bacchetta and Abhijit Banerjee, “Financial
Development and the Instability of Open Economies,” Harvard, December 2003.
Prasad,
Eswar S., Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei, and M. Ayan Kose, “Effects of
Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence,”
IMF Occasional Paper 220, March 2003.
6. Transition
The transition from central planning
to a market economy creates questions of special importance to development
economics. Transition economies are underdeveloped, but in ways different from
LDC’s. They have industry and they have already undergone the rural-urban
transition that is part of development, but they lack the institutions of
markets. How important are these institutional gaps?
This section is divided into
subsections, as it comprises a subject in and of itself. The first section provides
background into the system from which the transition starts.
A recent
report by the World Bank documents 10 years of transition and is a useful
source of information. It is available at: http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ECA/eca.nsf/Attachments/Transition1/$File/complete.pdf
1. Background
Ericson,
Richard, "The Classical Soviet-Type Economy: Nature of the System and
Implications for Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall,
1991.
GR, chapter 1.
Ickes,
Barry W., “Dimensions of Transition in Russia” in The Russian Economy in the
1990's, B. Granville and P. Oppenheimer, eds., Oxford University Press,
2001. WEB: http://econ.la.psu.edu/~bickes/granv.pdf
Hewett, Ed A., Reforming the
Soviet Economy: Equity and Efficiency, Brookings, 1990.
Ofer,
Gur, "Soviet Economic Growth: 1928-1985," Journal of Economic
Literature, December 1987.
Murrell,
Peter "Evolution in Economics and in the Economic Reform of the Centrally
Planned Economies." in Clague,
Christopher and Gordon C. Rausser, eds. Emergence of Market Economies in
Eastern Europe, Blackwell Publishers, 1992.
Litwack,
John, "Legality and Market Reform in Soviet Type Economies," Journal
of Economic Perspectives, Fall, 1991.
Kornai,
J. "The Hungarian Reform Process: Visions, Hopes, and Reality," Journal
of Economic Literature, Dec., 1986: 1687-1737.
Murphy,
Kevin, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, "The Transition to a Market
Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
August 1992.
2. Sequencing
McKinnon,
R., The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial Control in the
Transition to a Market Economy, Johns Hopkins Press, 1991, chapter 2.
GR, chapters 2-3.
Dewatripont,
M., and G. Roland, “Transition as a Process of Large-Scale Institutional
Change,” Economics of Transition, 4, 1, 1996: 1-30.
Dewatripont, M. and G. Roland,
“The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty,” American Economic Review,
85,5, December 1995.
Dewatripoint,
M. and Roland, G. “The Virtues of
Gradualism and Legitimacy in the transition to a Market Economy,” Economic
Policy, March 1992.
McMillan,
John, “Markets in Transition,” in D. Kreps and K. Wallis, eds., Advances in
Economics And Econometrics: Theory and Applications.
Ofer, Gur, "Stabilizing and
Restructuring the Soviet Economy: Big Bang or Gradual Sequencing?" in M.
Keren, and G. Ofer, eds., Trials of Transition: Economic Reform in the
Former Communist Bloc.
Aghion,
Phillipe and Olivier Blanchard, “On the Speed of Transition in
Alexeev,
Michael and Michael Kaganovich, “Dynamics of Privatization Under a Subsistence
Constraint,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 29, 2000: 417-447.
3.
The Output Fall and Stabilization
Blanchard,
O., and M. Kremer, “Disorganization,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
CXII, 4, November 1997.
Calvo,
G., and F. Coricelli, “Output Collapse in
Cochrane,
J.H., and B.W. Ickes, "Macroeconomics in
Ericson,
Richard E., “The Structural Barrier to Transition Hidden in Input-Output Tables
of Centrally Planned Economies,” Economic Systems, V.23, 3, September
1999, pp. 199-224.
Ickes,
B.W., and Randi Ryterman, "The Interenterprise Arrears Crisis in
Ickes,
B.W., and Randi Ryterman, "Roadblock to Economic Reform: The
Interenterprise Arrears Crisis in
Ickes,
B.W., and Randi Ryterman,
"Financial Underdevelopment and Macroeconomic Stabilization in
Russia," in G. Caprio, D. Folkerts-Landau, and T. Lane, eds., Building
Sound Finance in Emerging Market Economies, World Bank-IMF, 1994.
Fischer,
Stanley, Ratna Sahay, and Carlos Vegh, “Stabilization and Growth in Transition
Economies: Early Experience.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring
1996.
Ickes, Barry W., Peter Murrell
and Randi Ryterman, “End of the Tunnel? The Effects of Financial Stabilization
in
Fischer,
Stanley, and Ratna Sahay, “The Transition Economies After Ten Years,” IMF
Working Paper, February 2000.
GR, chapter 7.
4.
Privatization
Boycko,
M., A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny, "Privatizing
GR, chapters 4, 10.
Ickes,
B.W., and Randi Ryterman, "From
Katz,
B., and J. Owen, “Privatization: Choosing the Optimal Time Path,” Journal of
Comparative Economics, 17: 715-736.
Laban,
Raul and Holger Wolf, "Large-Scale Privatization in Transition
Economies," American Economic Review, 83, 5, December 1993.
Murrell,
P., and Y. Wang, “When Privatization Should be Delayed: The Effect of Communist
Legacies on Organizational and Institutional Reforms,” Journal of
Comparative Economics, 17: 385-406.
Roland,
G. and T. Verdier, “Privatization in
Shleifer,
A., and R. Vishny, “Politicians and Firms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
CIX, 4, November 1994: 995-1025.
5. Empirical Studies
Megginson
and Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization,
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 39, No. 2, June 2001.
Djankov,
Simeon D. and Peter Murrell, “Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A
Quantitative Survey” mimeo, WEB.
Berg,
Andrew ; Borensztein, Eduardo R ; Sahay, Ratna, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, “The
Evolution of Output in Transition Economies - Explaining the Differences,” IMF
Working Paper, No. 99/73, January 1999,
WEB.
Guriev,
Sergei, and Barry W. Ickes, “Microeconomic Aspects of Economic Growth in
Frydman,
R., Gray, Cheryl, Marek Hessel, and Andrzej Rapaczynski (1999). “When Does
Privatization WorkThe Impact of Private Ownership on Corporate Performance in
Transition Economies,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4).
Jones,
D., “The Economic Effects of Privatization: Evidence from a Russian Panel,” CES,
XXXX, 2, Summer 1998: 75-102.
Zettelmeyer,
Jeromin (1998). “The Uzbek Growth Puzzle,” IMF
Working Paper 98.
6. Corporate Governance and Corruption
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny, “A
Survey of Corporate Governance,” Journal of Finance, 52, June
1997:737-783.
Braguinsky,
Sergei and Roger Myerson, “Oligarchic
Property Rights and Investment,” September 2004
Aoki, M., “Controlling Insider
Control: Issues of Corporate Governance in Transition Economies,” in M. Aoki
and H Kim, eds., Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies. The
World Bank, 1995.
Claessens,
S., “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices: Evidence from the Czech and
Frydman, R., C. Gray, and A.
Rapaczynski, eds., Corporate Governance in
GR, chapter 8.
Brada,
J., “Corporate Governance in
Hellman,
J., G. Jones, and D. Kaufmann, “Seize the State, Seize the Day” State Capture,
Corruption, and Influence in Transition,” World Bank Discussion Policy Research
Working Paper, 2444, September 2000. WEB
Wei,
Shang-Jin, and Yi Wu, “ Negative Alchemy? Corruption, Composition of Capital
Flows, and Currency Crises, ” Brookings, February 2001, WEB.
Johnson,
S., D. Kaufmann, and A. Shleifer, “The Unofficial Economy in Transition,” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 1997.
Kaufmann,
Daniel and Aart Kraay, “Growth Without Governance,” World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper, 2928, November 2002.
Greif,
Avner, and Eugene Kandel, “Contract Enforcement Institutions: Historical
Perspective and Current Status in Russia, in Edward Lazear, ed., Economic Transition
in Eastern Europe and Russia, Hoover Institution Press, 1995.
Mehlum,
Halvor, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik, “ Predator or Prey? Parasitic
Enterprises in Economic Development,” European Economic Review, 47,
2003: 275-294.
7. Soft-Budget Constraints
Schaffer, Mark , “Do firms in
Transition Have Soft Budget Constraints? A Reconsideration of Concepts and
Evidence,” J. Comp. Econ. 26:1,
1998: 80-103.
Dewatripont,
Mathias and Eric Maskin, “Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and
Decentralized Economies,” The Review of Economic Studies 62:4, 1995: 541-55.
Kornai,
Janos, Eric Maskin, and Gerard Roland, “Understanding the Soft Budget
Constraint,” mimeo, Journal of Economic Literature, LXI, 4, December
2003.
Segal,
Ilya R., “Monopoly and Soft Budget Constraint,” Rand Journal of Economics 29:3,
1998: 596-609.
Roland,
chapter 8.
Deviatov, Alexei, and Barry W.
Ickes, “Reputation and the Soft-Budget Constraint,” April
2004.
8. Restructuring
Aghion, P., and O. Blanchard, “On
the Speed of Transition in
The
World Bank, From Transition to Development: A Country Economic
Memorandum for the Russian Federation, draft, April 2004.
Ericson,
Richard E., "Cost Tradeoffs in Activity Shutdowns: A Note on Economic
Restructuring During the Transition,"
in Robert Campbell ed., The
Postcommunist Economic Transformation: Essays in Honor of Gregory Grossman,
Westview Press, 1994
Ericson,
R., “Restructuring Investment in Transition: A Model of the
Blanchard,
O., The Economics of Post-Communist Transition.
Pinto,
Brian, Marek Belka and Stefan Krajewski, "Transforming State Enterprises
in
GR, chapter 5.
Gaddy,
Clifford and Barry W. Ickes, “To Restructure or Not to Restructure: Informal
Activities and
Ericson,
R.E., and Barry W. Ickes, “A Model of Russia’s Virtual Economy,” Review of
Economic Design, vol. 6, 2, September 2001.
Guriev,
Sergei and Barry W. Ickes, “Barter in
8.5 Federalism and Governance
Blanchard,
Olivier, and Andrei Shleifer, “Federalism With and Without Political Centralization,”
October 2000.
Ickes,
Barry W., and Gur Ofer, “The Political Economy of Structural Change in Russia,”
November 2003.
Gaddy,
Clifford, and Barry W. Ickes, The
Economics of Market-Impeding Federalism,” November 2003.
9.
McMillan,
John, and Barry Naughton, “How to Reform a Communist Economy: Lessons from
Sachs,
Jeffrey and Wing T. Woo, “Structural Factors in the Economic Reforms of
Qian, Yingyi, “How Reform Worked in
Lau,
L., Y. Qian, and G. Roland, “Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of
China’s Dual-Track Approach to Reforms,” JPE, vol. 108, 1, 2000:
120-163.
Li, Wei, “A Tale of Two Reforms,” Rand Journal of
Economics, 30, 1999.
GR, chapter 6.
Young,
Alwyn, “Gold into Base Metals: Productivity Growth in the People’s Republic of
Young,
Alwyn, “The Razor’s Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People’s
Republic of
10. The Transition Process
Roland,
Gerard, “The Political Economy of Transition,” William Davidson Working Paper
Number 413, December 2001 WEB.
Berglof,
Erik, and Patrick Bolton, “The Great Divide and Beyond: Financial Architecture
in Transition,” William Davidson Working Paper Number 414, December 2001 WEB.
Ickes,
Barry W., “Evolution and Transition,” forthcoming.
GR, chapter 13.
Stiglitz, Joseph, “Whither Reform?
Ten Years of the Transition,” ABCDE Conference, 1999. WEB
Here is a link to last year’s final exam.