Research
Faculty
Publications
Nageeb Ali: “Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing” Review of Economic Studies, 2022
Nageeb Ali, Nima Haghpanah, Xiao Lin, and Ron Siegel: “How to Sell Hard Information” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2022
Nageeb Ali and Chloe Tergiman: “Adverse and Advantageous Selection in the Laboratory” American Economic Review, 2021
Kalyan Chatterjee, Konstantin Guryev, Tai-Wei Hu: “Bounded memory in a changing world: Biases in behaviour and belief” Journal of Economic Theory, 2022
Kalyan Chatterjee: “Attack and Interception in Networks” Theoretical Economics, 2022
Kalyan Chatterjee, Pathikrit Basu, Tetsuya Hoshino: “Repeated Coordination with Private Learning” Journal of Economic Theory, 2020
Nima Haghpanah and Ron Siegel: “Pareto Improving Segmentation of Multi-product markets” Journal of Political Economy, 2022
Nima Haghpanah and Ron Siegel: “The Limits of Multi-Product Price Discrimination” American Economic Review-Insights, 2022
Nima Haghpanah: “When is Pure Bundling Optimal?” Review of Economic Studies, 2021
Yuhta Ishii: “Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative Societies” American Economic Review, 2022
Yuhta Ishii: “Belief Convergence under Misspecified Learning: A Martingale Approach” Review of Economic Studies, 2022
Yuhta Ishii: “Misinterpreting Others and the Fragility of Social Learning” Econometrica, 2020
Vijay Krishna, Yu Awaya: “Startups and Upstarts: Disadvantageous Information in R&D” Journal of Political Economy, 2021
Vijay Krishna, Yu Awaya: “Communication and Cooperation in Repeated Games” Theoretical Economics, 2019
Rohit Lamba, Ilia Krasikov: “Implications of Unequal Discounting in Dynamic Contracting” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022
Rohit Lamba, Ilia Krasikov: “A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints” Journal of Economic Theory, 2021
Rohit Lamba: “Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond” Theoretical Economics, 2019
Ran Shorrer: “Making it Safe to Use Centralized Marketplaces: Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design” Management Science, 2021
Ran Shorrer: “The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures” Management Science, 2021
Ron Siegel: “Equilibrium Existence in Games with Ties” Theoretical Economics, 2022
Ron Siegel: “Judicial Mechanism Design” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022
(For brevity, author lists include only Penn State faculty and students)
About Theory
The Microeconomic Theory group currently includes nine full-time faculty members. Members of this vibrant group have interests that cover a broad range of topics, including mechanism design, game theory, decision theory, political economy, networks, matching, and behavioral economics.
The group’s research advances theory and develops new applications. Its breadth is signified by recent publications on communication in repeated games, large contests, strategic learning in networks, bilateral and multilateral bargaining, among many more.
Activities include a seminar for external speakers, an additional workshop for internal and external speakers, a reading group on current research topics, and two annual theory conferences.