S. Nageeb Ali, “Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining,” with B.D. Bernheim and X. Fan, Review of Economic Studies, 2019

Kalyan Chatterjee, “Learning and Habit Formation: Optimal Timing of Lockdown for Disease Containment,” with S. Bandyopadhyay, K. Das,  and J. Roy, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2021

Kalyan Chatterjee, “Repeated Coordination with Private Learning,” with P. Basu, T. Hoshino, and O. Tamuz, Journal of Economic Theory, 2020

Nima Haghpanah, “Full surplus extraction from samples,” with H. Fu, J. Hartline, and R. Kleinberg, Journal of Economic Theory, 2021

Nima Haghpanah, “When is Pure Bundling Optimal?” with J. Hartline, Review of Economic Studies, 2020

Yuhta Ishii, “A Model of Stochastic Choice from Lists,” with M. Kovach and L. Ulku, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2021

Yuhta Ishii, “Misinterpreting Others and the Fragility of Social Learning,” with M. Frick and R. Iijima, Econometrica, 2020

Vijay Krishna, “Startups and Upstarts: Disadvantageous Information in R&D,” with Y. Awaya, Journal of Political Economy, 2021

Vijay Krishna, “On Communication and Collusion,” with Y. Awaya, American Economic Review, 2016

Rohit Lamba, “A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints,” with I. Krasikov, Journal of Economic Theory, 2021

Rohit Lamba, “Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond,” with M. Battaglini, Theoretical Economics, 2019

Ran Shorrer, “Making it Safe to Use Centralized Marketplaces: Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design,” with B. Roth, Management Science, 2021

Ran Shorrer, “The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures,”  with A. Hassidim and A. Romm, Management Science, 2021

Ron Siegel, “Performance-Maximizing Large Contests,” with W. Olszewski, Theoretical Economics, 2020

Ron Siegel, “Large Contests,” with W. Olszewski, Econometrica, 2016



About Theory

The Microeconomic Theory group currently includes nine full-time faculty members. Members of this vibrant group have interests that cover a broad range of topics, including mechanism design, game theory, decision theory, political economy, networks, matching, and behavioral economics.

The group’s research advances theory and develops new applications. Its breadth is signified by recent publications on communication in repeated games, large contests, strategic learning in networks, bilateral and multilateral bargaining, among many more.

Activities include a seminar for external speakers, an additional workshop for internal and external speakers, a reading group on current research topics, and two annual theory conferences.

Related Event Seminars

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