S. Nageeb Ali, “Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining,” with B.D. Bernheim and X. Fan, Review of Economic Studies, 2019
Kalyan Chatterjee, “Learning and Habit Formation: Optimal Timing of Lockdown for Disease Containment,” with S. Bandyopadhyay, K. Das, and J. Roy, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2021
Kalyan Chatterjee, “Repeated Coordination with Private Learning,” with P. Basu, T. Hoshino, and O. Tamuz, Journal of Economic Theory, 2020
Nima Haghpanah, “Full surplus extraction from samples,” with H. Fu, J. Hartline, and R. Kleinberg, Journal of Economic Theory, 2021
Nima Haghpanah, “When is Pure Bundling Optimal?” with J. Hartline, Review of Economic Studies, 2020
Yuhta Ishii, “A Model of Stochastic Choice from Lists,” with M. Kovach and L. Ulku, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2021
Yuhta Ishii, “Misinterpreting Others and the Fragility of Social Learning,” with M. Frick and R. Iijima, Econometrica, 2020
Vijay Krishna, “Startups and Upstarts: Disadvantageous Information in R&D,” with Y. Awaya, Journal of Political Economy, 2021
Vijay Krishna, “On Communication and Collusion,” with Y. Awaya, American Economic Review, 2016
Rohit Lamba, “A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints,” with I. Krasikov, Journal of Economic Theory, 2021
Rohit Lamba, “Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond,” with M. Battaglini, Theoretical Economics, 2019
Ran Shorrer, “Making it Safe to Use Centralized Marketplaces: Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design,” with B. Roth, Management Science, 2021
Ran Shorrer, “The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures,” with A. Hassidim and A. Romm, Management Science, 2021
Ron Siegel, “Performance-Maximizing Large Contests,” with W. Olszewski, Theoretical Economics, 2020
Ron Siegel, “Large Contests,” with W. Olszewski, Econometrica, 2016
The Microeconomic Theory group currently includes nine full-time faculty members. Members of this vibrant group have interests that cover a broad range of topics, including mechanism design, game theory, decision theory, political economy, networks, matching, and behavioral economics.
The group’s research advances theory and develops new applications. Its breadth is signified by recent publications on communication in repeated games, large contests, strategic learning in networks, bilateral and multilateral bargaining, among many more.
Activities include a seminar for external speakers, an additional workshop for internal and external speakers, a reading group on current research topics, and two annual theory conferences.