Nageeb Ali: “Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing” Review of Economic Studies, 2022

Nageeb Ali, Nima Haghpanah, Xiao Lin, and Ron Siegel: “How to Sell Hard Information” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2022

Nageeb Ali and Chloe Tergiman: “Adverse and Advantageous Selection in the LaboratoryAmerican Economic Review, 2021

Kalyan Chatterjee, Konstantin Guryev, Tai-Wei Hu: “Bounded memory in a changing world: Biases in behaviour and beliefJournal of Economic Theory, 2022

Kalyan Chatterjee: “Attack and Interception in NetworksTheoretical Economics, 2022

Kalyan Chatterjee, Pathikrit Basu, Tetsuya Hoshino: “Repeated Coordination with Private Learning”  Journal of Economic Theory, 2020

Nima Haghpanah and Ron Siegel: “Pareto Improving Segmentation of Multi-product markets” Journal of Political Economy, 2022

Nima Haghpanah and Ron Siegel: “The Limits of Multi-Product Price Discrimination” American Economic Review-Insights, 2022

Nima Haghpanah: “When is Pure Bundling Optimal?Review of Economic Studies, 2021

Yuhta Ishii: “Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative Societies”  American Economic Review, 2022

Yuhta Ishii: “Belief Convergence under Misspecified Learning: A Martingale ApproachReview of Economic Studies, 2022

Yuhta Ishii:  “Misinterpreting Others and the Fragility of Social LearningEconometrica, 2020

Vijay Krishna, Yu Awaya: “Startups and Upstarts: Disadvantageous Information in R&DJournal of Political Economy, 2021

Vijay Krishna, Yu Awaya: “Communication and Cooperation in Repeated Games” Theoretical Economics, 2019

Rohit Lamba, Ilia Krasikov: “Implications of Unequal Discounting in Dynamic Contracting” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022

Rohit Lamba, Ilia Krasikov: “A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraintsJournal of Economic Theory, 2021

Rohit Lamba: “Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyondTheoretical Economics, 2019

Ran Shorrer: “Making it Safe to Use Centralized Marketplaces: Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market DesignManagement Science, 2021

Ran Shorrer: “The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures”  Management Science, 2021

Ron Siegel: “Equilibrium Existence in Games with TiesTheoretical Economics, 2022

Ron Siegel: “Judicial Mechanism DesignAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022

(For brevity, author lists include only Penn State faculty and students)


About Theory

The Microeconomic Theory group currently includes nine full-time faculty members. Members of this vibrant group have interests that cover a broad range of topics, including mechanism design, game theory, decision theory, political economy, networks, matching, and behavioral economics.

The group’s research advances theory and develops new applications. Its breadth is signified by recent publications on communication in repeated games, large contests, strategic learning in networks, bilateral and multilateral bargaining, among many more.

Activities include a seminar for external speakers, an additional workshop for internal and external speakers, a reading group on current research topics, and two annual theory conferences.

Related Event Seminars

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